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Abstract 
The 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution is often presented as building 
on the local traditions of indigenous peoples in order to propose a 
non-anthropocentric approach to the conservation of the 
environment, based on the concept of buen vivir. After providing a 
short introduction on anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric 
approaches to the environment, with attention to indigenous 
worldviews, this article attempts to: analyse the concept of buen 
vivir, appearing to have unclear boundaries; understand whether or 
not it is a concept derived from indigenous worldviews; and explore 
the innovative non-anthropocentric feature of the recognition of 
rights to the environment. Finally, the article uses the idea of rights 
of the environment as a key to interpret the fuzzy concept of buen 
vivir in the most effective way to enhance the conservation of the 
environment. 
Keywords: environmental rigths, Ecuador, constitution, 
indigenous peoples, buen vivir 
Parole chiave: etica dell’ambiente, Equador, Costituzione, 
popoli indigeni, buen vivir 
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1. Introduction 
The article analyses the main features of the 2008 Ecuadorian 
Constitution which enhances the common recognition of the need to 
protect the environment by recognizing the latter as a holder of 
rights. The Constitution is often presented as building on the local 
traditions of indigenous peoples, thereby proposing a non-
anthropocentric approach to environmental protection based on the 
all-encompassing concept of buen vivir. The Ecuadorian 
Constitution is cherished as the convergence of indigenous 
cosmovisions and the concept of rights of nature – a development 
which could promote abandoning the overexploitation of natural 
resources, especially by extractive industries 1 . After providing a 
short introduction on the difference between anthropocentric and 
non-anthropocentric approaches to the environment, with attention 
to indigenous peoples’ worldviews, the article attempts to: analyse 
the concept of buen vivir, which appears to have unclear boundaries; 
understand whether or not it is a concept derived from indigenous 
worldviews; and explore the innovative non-anthropocentric features 
of the recognition of rights to the environment. Finally, in order to 
enhance the conservation of the environment in the most effective 
way, the article uses the concept of rights of the environment as a 
key to interpret the fuzzy concept of buen vivir. 
2. Environmental Value 
The new environmental features of the Ecuadorian Constitution 
bring attention to the long-discussed problem concerning the value 
of the environment. Theories of environmental ethics strive to 
answer the question: how do we understand what ought to be 
recognized value and why? Western environmental ethics can be 
described as divided into two main streams – anthropocentric and 
non-anthropocentric ethics – providing different answers to the 
what, but, more importantly, to the why. The most intuitive means of 
attributing value to something is to understand whether it is useful. 
In general, something is considered valuable if it has a utility for 
human beings, either directly or indirectly. This kind of value is 
referred to as non-intrinsic, instrumental value. In order to 
understand whether something has non-intrinsic value we need to 
 
1  For a critical appraisal see L.J. Kotzè and P. Calzadilla Villavicencio, 
Somewhere between Rhetoric and Reality: Environmental Constitutionalism 
and the Rights of Nature in Ecuador ,  in «Transnational  Environmental Law», 
2017, p. 15 f.  
 4 
revert to something that comes before and which justifies the value 
to be attributed. But we cannot revert an infinite number of times. 
There must be something, at the end, that is considered to have 
intrinsic value 2 , which is non-instrumental, because it cannot be 
deduced by the utility for something/someone else: «an object has 
intrinsic value if is an end in itself»3. 
2.1. Anthropocentric Ethics 
Anthropocentric approaches and arguments to the conservation 
of the environment, such as it is in your interest to respect the 
environment or if you damage the environment you damage 
humankind/yourself, are surely the most commonly diffused to 
promote respect and condemn disrespect towards the environment. 
In these arguments the environment does not figure as a holder of 
value per se  but as the holder of value for the sake of humankind. 
Anthropocentric ethics are the direct successors of classic Western 
ethics, as they are a reinterpretation of their same ethical grounds4. 
They build on the understanding of the duty to respect other human 
beings and, by extending the needs of human beings to those 
concerning the environment they include duties to conserve it. Such 
duty is not towards the environment, it simply regards the 
environment. It remains a duty towards humankind and is «a matter 
of prudence»5. 
 
2 M.J. Zimmerman, Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value ,  in E.N. Zalta, edited by, The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,  2015. 
3 J.  O’Neill,  The Varieties of Intrinsic Value ,  in «The Monist», 75-2, 1992, p. 
119–37. Although this is the most common understanding of the concept of 
intrinsic value it  is necessary to underline that it  remains an ambiguous term, 
which can be defined in a second and third sense: 2) referring solely to the 
non-relational properties of an object; 3) referring to an objective value, 
independent of any value-attributing subject.  For the purpose of the present 
work, intrinsic value will be considered only in the first sense, clarifying the 
fact that being attributed intrinsic value in the first sense does not imply 
attribution of intrinsic value in the second and third senses. For example, 
wilderness can be considered having intrinsic value in the first sense. 
However, it  does not have intrinsic value in the second sense, because the 
concept of wilderness implies the idea of (a lack of) contact with human 
beings, which is a relational consideration (second sense of the term). 
4 J.  Passmore, Men’s Responsability for Nature ,  New York, Scribner’s, 1974, 
p. 186 f. ,  cited in J.R. DesJardins, Environmental Ethics. An Introduction to 
Environmetal Philosophy ,  Belmont, California, Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 
2013, p. 102. 
5 Ibidem ,  p. 98. 
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Anthropocentric views are strongly criticized precisely for such 
focus on human interests because they can justify the use of the 
environment «merely as a storehouse of raw materials to be 
extracted and used for products serving human preferences»6. 
Anthropocentric views can, however, push the borders of 
environmental protection beyond the mere conservation of natural 
resources instrumentally valuable to humans7. Aesthetic value8, the 
value of knowledge, and the recognition of rights and interests to 
future generations9 extend such borders while remaining focused on 
what is, or will be, thought to be of some value to humans10. They 
are valuable political strategies: policy makers are likely to give 
little attention to intrinsic value considerations, while they are more 
likely to be appealed by considerations concerning human-oriented 
reasons11. 
2.2. Non-anthropocentric Ethics 
Starting from Aristotle, Aquinas and Kant until most recent 
ethicists, the Western tradition hardly ever recognizes moral 
standing – i.e. to be a source of moral claim, an entity that must be 
considered in moral deliberations – of entities other than human 
beings12. The environmental challenges we have started facing in the 
last century have inspired many philosophers to answer the call for a 
new environmental ethic extending the recognition of intrinsic value 
and moral considerations and standing to non-human entities: 
animals, living things, species, non-living natural entities, and the 
Earth. The recognition of moral standing to the environment is the 
distinguishing characteristic of non-anthropocentric ethic, where 
three different streams can be distinguished. 
 
6  B.G. Norton, Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism ,  in 
«Environmental Ethics», 6, 1984, p. 135. 
7 J.  Benson, Environmental Ethics. An Introduction with Readings ,  London, 
New York, Routledge, 2000, p. 85. 
8 Ibidem .  
9 Norton,  Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism ,  cit .  
10 Benson, Environmental Ethics. An Introduction with Readings ,  p. 86, cit .  
11 B.G. Norton, The Cultural Approach to Coservation Biology,  in Century ,  D. 
Western and M. Pearl,  edited by, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 
241–46. 
12  DesJardins, Environmental Ethics. An Introduction to Environmetal 
Philosophy ,  100, cit .  
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The first stream welcomes authors with different views 
concerning which animals should be recognized holders of rights13. 
Animal rights theories tend to have an individualistic approach, as 
they are mostly concerned with stopping the use of animals for food, 
research, clothing and entertainment, rather than with the protection 
of endangered species and whole ecosystems 14 . Arguing for 
individual animal rights or arguing for species and ecosystems 
protection differs strongly in terms of environmental consequences. 
Managing and protecting a species or a habitat requires recognising 
unequal moral standing to different animals, depending on the 
species or variety (endangered or abundant, local or invasive), 
including suppressing invasive species15. 
A second stream, biocentric ethics, enlarges the realm of moral 
consideration to all living beings, with being alive becoming the 
relevant characteristic 16 . Most biocentric ethicists maintain an 
individualistic approach, so species and ecosystems do not fall 
within their realm of consideration 17 . Similarly, rivers and 
mountains, landscapes and the air are not biological beings and 
hence are not intrinsically considered worthy of respect. 
 
13  See for example T. Regan, Animal Rights: What’s in a Name ,  in 
Environmental Ethics. An Anthology ,  A. Light and H. Rolston III,  edited by, 
Malden, Oxford, Victoria, Blackwell Publishing, 2012, p. 65–71. On the 
protection of animals adopting a utilitarian stance see P. Singer, Animal 
Liberation ,  New York, HarperCollinsPublishers, 1975. Singer finds the source 
of moral standing in a characteristic that almost all  animals have: sentience, 
i .e.  the capacity of suffering and enjoyment. For more details on the 
utilitarian approach to animal rights, its advantages and problems also see S. 
Castignone, nuovi diritti  e nuovi soggetti .  Appunti di bioetica e biodiritto ,  
Genova, ECIG - Edizioni Culturali Internationali Genova, 1996, p. 123 ff.  
14 T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights ,  in In Defense of Animals ,  P. Singer, 
edited by, Oxford, Basil Blackwell,  1985, p. 13; Regan, Animal Rights: 
What’s in a Name ,  cit .  
15  G.E. Varner, Can Animal Rights Activists Be Environmentalists ,  in 
Environmental Philosophy and Environmental Activism ,  D.E. Marietta and L. 
Embree, edited by, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1995. The 
need to implement these types of actions has led conservationists to be 
accused of environmental fascism by animal rights supporters because of their 
willingness to sacrifice individual animals, see Regan, Animal Rights: What’s 
in a Name ,  cit .  
16  DesJardins, Environmental Ethics. An Introduction to Environmetal 
Philosophy ,  p. 136 ff,  cit .  See among the others: P.W. Taylor, Respect for 
Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics ,  Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1986, p. 40 ff. 
17 Ibidem ,  p. 143 and 151. 
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A third stream of theories attributes moral standing to living 
communities, species or the Earth itself, and better accommodates 
conservation considerations. Ecocentric ethics are holistic, as they 
place ecological communities at the centre of moral concern and 
deeply rely on the science of ecology to frame their ethical 
principles18. Not all entities are considered worthy of moral standing 
in their individuality, but rather as elements of ecosystems. Hence, 
typical conservation science actions, such as the eradication of 
invasive species, may be accommodated because they aim at the 
conservation of, in Aldo Leopold’ words, the «integrity, stability 
and beauty of the biotic community»19.  
Leopold hopes that through the study and understanding of 
ecology there can be a change in human psychology, such as that 
Western societies come to love and admire the Earth20. This change 
in human psychology requires raising awareness on the current 
environmental crisis, gaining contact with the natural world and 
reframing our relationship with it. Interestingly, it seems that many 
indigenous peoples and local communities, «who have become 
effective leaders in the environment and human rights movement»21, 
do not need to undertake such a psychological turn, as their ethical 
underpinnings already comprehend different forms of respect and 
reverence for the Earth and place humankind in a custodianship role 
towards nature22. 
2.3. An Indigenous Take on the Environment 
It is increasingly frequent to hear indigenous leaders, non-
governmental organizations, and even states, talk about the role that 
indigenous peoples have for the conservation of the environment. 
This mantra  made its official appearance at the international level 
with the Rio Declaration, the document adopted at the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992. Principle 22 of the Declaration explicitly 
acknowledges the vital role that indigenous peoples have in 
 
18 Ibidem ,  p. 152 and 163. 
19 A. Leopold, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There ,  London, 
Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1949. 
20 Ibidem .  
21  D.A. Posey, edited by, Cultural and Spiritual Values of Biodiversity. A 
Complementary Contribution to the Global Biodiversity Assessment ,  Nairobi, 
Intermediate Technology Publication, 1999, p. 15. 
22  See J.B. Callicott,  The Challenge of a World Environmental Ethic ,  in 
«American Journal of Theology &  Philosophy», 18-1, 1997, p. 69. 
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«environmental management and development because of their 
knowledge and traditional practices». Through the adoption, the 
year after, of the Convention on Biological Diversity 23 , the 
importance of indigenous peoples in the conservation debate was 
crafted in international law. Following these recognitions, their role 
has become one of the flagships of the indigenous peoples rights 
movement. It was estimated that about 80 percent of plant 
biodiversity is found in that part of the global territory which is 
inhabited by indigenous peoples, which, in turn, equals 22 percent 
of the total global territory 24. Most importantly, such sustainable 
relationship with the environment is grounded in an inextricable 
link between their cultural diversity and the diversity of local 
ecosystems 25 . The anthropologist Darrel Posey coined the term  
biocultural diversity to describe such mutually beneficial 
relationship between certain peoples and their environments 26 . 
Biocultural diversity comprises traditional knowledge about the 
biotic and a-biotic elements of ecosystems, beliefs, social, cultural, 
spiritual and economic practices connected with the environment27. 
 
23 Articles 8j and 10c. 
24 C. Sobrevila, The Role of Indigenous Peoples in Biodiversity Conservation. 
The Natural but Often Forgotten Partners ,  Washington DC, The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2008. 
25 A. Kothari et al. ,  edited by, Recognising and Supporting Territories and 
Areas Conserved by Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities. Global 
Overview and National Case Studies ,  CBD Technical Series, Montreal,  
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2012, p. 9; C. Bèlair et 
al. ,  edited by, Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity in Socio-Ecological 
Production Landscapes. Background to the “Sotoyama Initiative for the 
Benefit  of Biodiversity and Human Well-Being” ,  CBD Technical Series, 
Montreal,  Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010; G. 
Calvo Valderrama and S. Arico, Traditional Knowledge: From Environmental 
Management to Territorial Development ,  in Traditional Knowledge in Policy 
and Practice ,  S. Subramanian and B. Pisupati,  edited by, Hong Kong, United 
Nations University, 2010, p. 208–25; M. Cocks, Biocultural Diversity: 
Moving Beyond the Realm of “Indigenous” and “Local” People, in «Human 
Ecology», 34-2, 2006, p. 188. 
26  Posey, Cultural and Spiritual Values of Biodiversity. A Complementary 
Contribution to the Global Biodiversity Assessment,  cit .  
27 J.L. Slikkerveer, Ethnoscience, “TEK” and Its Application to Conservation ,  
in Cultural and Spiritual Values of Biodiversity. A Complementary 
Contribution to the Global Biodiversity Assessment ,  D.A. Posey, edited by, 
Nairobi, Intermediate Technology Publication, 1999, p. 169–258; G. Dutfield, 
Rights, Resources and Responses ,  in Cultural and Spiritual Values of 
Biodiversity. A Complementary Contribution to the Global Biodiversity 
Assessment ,  D.A. Posey, edited by, Intermediate Technology Publication, 
1999, p. 550; L. Maffi,  Linguistic, Cultural, and Biological Diversity ,  
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Indigenous peoples present very diverse and complex approaches, 
which were developed over millennia in different lands and 
ecosystems28. Such relationships are embedded in cultural practices 
«entrusting stewardship» of their ancestral lands29. They know that 
«their lives and immediate futures – as well as the well-being of 
future generations» depend on their lands and natural resources 30. 
Because of their direct dependence they have maintained a clearer 
perception – clearer than people living on the market economy in 
towns and cities 31  – of their reliance on lands, rivers, plants and 
animals. 
As different studies show, indigenous peoples around the world 
have often developed similar grounds of a conservation ethic to 
guide such sustainable lifestyles and stewardship relationships with 
the environment32. Their environmental ethics can – in very general 
terms – be described as holistic and based on the idea of 
interconnection between human, animal, floral and a-biotic elements 
of ecosystems, where human beings are an integral part of nature, 
together with their culture and practices33. The idea of reciprocity, 
equilibrium and duality (everything has a complementary opposite 
and balance must be kept) in exchanges with nature seem to 
contradistinguish many indigenous peoples’ relationships with 
nature based on the idea that human beings are spiritually linked to 
 
«Annual Review of Anthropology», 29, 2005, p. 600; Kothari et al. ,  
Recognising and Supporting Territories and Areas Conserved by Indigenous 
Peoples and Local Communities. Global Overview and National Case Studies ,  
p. 19, cit .  
28  M.F. Jaksa, Putting the “Sustainable” Back in Sustainable Development: 
Recognizing and Enforcing Indigenous Property Rights as a Pathway to 
Global Environmental Sustainability,  in «Journal of Environmental Law and 
Litigation», 21-1, 2006, p. 162. 
29 Ibidem .  
30  L. Maffi,  Biocultural Approaches to Conservation and Development ,  in 
Biocultural Diversity Toolkit ,  L. Maffi and D. Ortixia, edited by, Terralingua, 
2014, p. 4. 
31  D. Suzuki, Finding a New Story ,  in Cultural and Spiritual Values of 
Biodiversity. A Complementary Contribution to the Global Biodiversity 
Assessment ,  D.A. Posey, edited by, Nairobi, Intermediate Technology 
Publication, 1999, p. 72. 
32  Posey, Cultural and Spiritual Values of Biodiversity. A Complementary 
Contribution to the Global Biodiversity Assessment ,  cit .  
33  K. Swiderska et al. ,  Protecting Community Rights over Traditional 
Knowledge. Implications of Customary Laws and Practices. Key Findings and 
Recommendations 2005-2009 ,  IIED - International Institute for Environment 
and Development, 2009. 
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the environment34. Their practices are regulated through customary 
laws, religious practices and taboos whose enforcement is perceived 
as overviewed by spiritual entities. For example a world-wide study 
on sacred natural sites – «areas of lands or water having special 
spiritual significance to peoples and communities»35 – has indicated 
that the attribution of sacred meanings to nature itself, or historical 
or mythological events occurred on the natural site, has guaranteed 
the preservation of the site at the same level, and sometimes even 
higher, as in protected areas36. 
The construction of indigenous peoples as ontological 
conservationists needs to be treated with care to avoid falling for 
the ecologically noble savage  myth 37 . Indigenous peoples are not 
static, frozen pictures of the past. They are thriving and changing 
communities that struggle to survive in their lands, fighting more 
with colonial or post-colonial impositions than with the 
environment. Of course, both the thriving and the struggling bring 
changes and such changes may, as it happens in all other societies, 
have negative impacts on the environment. The ecologically noble 
savage myth, as all romanticizing, is a naive illustration of 
indigenous peoples as intrinsically ecological that may give little 
help to indigenous peoples and conservation movements38 weakening 
the understanding of the nuances and dynamics of reality. 
However, indigenous worldviews, if carefully listened to, can 
be incorporated in the law of Western countries in the attempt to 
create new systems and structures which better protect the 
environment 39. The Ecuadorian Constitution is an example of such 
 
34 Ibidem .  
35 B. Verschuuren et al. ,  edited by, Sacred Natural Sites. Conserving Nature 
& Culture, London, Washington, Earthscan, 2010, p. 1.  
36 Ibidem ,  p. 1–19. 
37  K. Redford, The Ecologically Noble Savage ,  in «Cultural Survival 
Quarterly», 15-1, 1991, p. 46–48. 
38  A.C. Claus, C.M.A. Kai, and T. Satterfield, The Roles of People in 
Conservation ,  in Conservation Biology for All ,  N.S. Sodhi and P.R. Ehrlich, 
edited by, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 269; D.A. Posey, 
Introduction: Culture and Nature - The Inextricable Link ,  in Cultural and 
Spiritual Values of Biodiversity. A Complementary Contribution to the Global 
Biodiversity Assessment ,  D.A. Posey, edited by, Nairobi, Intermediate 
Technology Publication, 1999, p. 7.  
39 On the incorporating Maori cosmologies in New Zealand law, see C.J. Iorns 
Magallanes, Maori Cultural Rights in Aotearoa New Zealand: Protecting the 
Cosmology That Protects the Enviroment ,  in «Wideren Law Review», 21-2, 
2015, p. 275. 
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an attempt to find convergence between new Western environmental 
ethics approaches and indigenous worldviews. 
3. Ecuador: Constitutional Paths for Conservation 
3.1. The Environment in Constitutional Texts 
Vis à vis the rising awareness of the current environmental 
crisis, an increasing number of state constitutions has entailed 
provisions concerning the protection of the environment, or has 
recognized certain human rights to environmental assets. The first 
ever was Switzerland which in 1971 introduced the human right to a 
non-hazardous environment through a referendum. Today, out of 
193 constitutions, 147 include environmental provisions40. Some are 
rudimentary references to the protection of national beauties and 
artistic heritage (such as in the constitutions of Italy, Malta, 
Guatemala and San Marino), while others include specific 
obligations of the government41 to the protection of biodiversity, the 
promotion of sustainable development for present and future 
generations (Sweden), the prevention of pollution, or the creation 
and preservation of protected areas (Portugal). Ninety-two countries 
recognize human rights to natural assets, such as right to live in a 
healthy environment (among which almost all Latin American 
countries 42 ) or the right to clean waters (such as South Africa), 
while the constitutions of Germany, India and Switzerland recognize 
rights to animals. 
The text of the new Ecuadorian Constitution is in line with the 
trends of the Latin American constitutionalism, as it provides for a 
constitutional, democratic, intercultural, laic state grounded in the 
recognition of a list of fundamental rights43. It is a long44 and rigid 
 
40  D.R. Boyd, The Environmental Rigths Revolution. A Global Study of 
Constitutions, Human Rights and the Environment ,  Vancouver, University of 
British Columbia Press, 2012, chap. 3. 
41  Eighty-three also include individual duties towards the protection of the 
environment and of these six (Algeria, Estonia, Laos, Papua New Guinea, 
Syrian Arab Republic and Vanuatu) recognize only individual 
responsibilities, not governmental ones, see Ibidem ,  note 58. 
42  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,  Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Venezuela, see Ibidem ,  note 42. 
43  E. Acuna Rozo, Il constituzionalismo in vigore nei paesi dell’america 
latina ,  Torino, Giappichelli  Editore, 2012, p. 322. 
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constitution composed of 444 articles, structured in nine titles, each 
divided in chapters. It distinguishes itself because it was the first 
constitution taking the struggle for the protection of nature further 
by transforming the latter into a holder of rights: «Nature shall be 
the subject of those rights that the Constitution recognizes for it» 
(art. 10). The recognition of rights to nature is embedded in a wider 
innovation in the Constitution: the introduction of the concept of 
buen vivir (sumak kawsay in the indigenous Quechua language). 
Buen vivir  is not explicitly defined in the text but it is presented as 
the «vertebral axis» of the new Constitution in the Plan Nacional 
para el Buen Vivir del Ecuador 2009-2013 (then updated in the 
2013-2017 version) 45. In the Plan Nacional, buen vivir  is the key 
term to promote the realization of a new all-encompassing 
development discourse to protect the historically marginalized 
sections of society, and to turn towards sustainable and intercultural 
forms of production through a new form of development, not based 
on capitalistic assumptions but rather on indigenous principles of 
inclusivity and interdependence46. 
The Constitutional Preamble announces the creation of: «a new 
form of public coexistence, in diversity and in harmony with nature, 
to achieve buen vivir , sumak kawsay». In fact, buen vivir  is 
proposed as the indigenous alternative to economic development 47, 
 
44  Just like the Brazilian and Bolivian constitutions, the new Ecuadorian 
Constitution enumerates a long list of political,  economic, social and cultural 
rights recognizing them to different subjects. Compared with the European 
and United States’ constitutions, these types of texts have been strongly 
criticized as stating utopian aspirations rather than actually protected and 
enforced rights, see R. Gargarella and C. Courtis,  El Nuevo 
Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano: Promesas e Interrogantes ,  Washington 
DC, United Nations, 2009, p. 31. While recognizing the problem linked to 
today’s inflation of rights, Gargarella and Courtis underline that the 
recognition of rights in constitutions does not guarantee their promotion and 
respect in reality but that their absence in texts is somehow correlated to their 
continued violation in reality, see Ibidem ,  p. 32. 
45 Senplades, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo/ Plan Nacional Para El Buen Vivir 
2013-2017 ,  Quito, 2013, p. 23 (my translation). The Plan Nacional de 
Desarrollo is,  according to art.  280 of the Constitution, the instrument 
devoted to lead public policies, programs and projects, the distribution of 
public resources and the coordination between the state and the local 
governments. 
46 F. Houtart,  El concepto de sumak kawsay (buen vivir) y su correspondencia 
con el bien común de la humanidad ,  in «Ecuador Debate», 84, 2011, p. 73 f.  
47 S. Baldin, I diritti  della natura nelle costituzioni di Ecuador e Bolivia ,  in 
«Visioni  LatinoAmericane», 10, 2014, p. 29. 
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which, instead of focusing solely on the human condition, 
underlines the interdependency between humans and Pacha Mama , 
i.e. nature and the surrounding environment48. 
Buen vivir  is elected as the interpreting principle of Chapter II, 
Rights of Buen Vivir , of Title II. The Chapter lists human rights to 
water and food, a healthy environment, communication and 
information, science and culture, education, habitat, health, work, 
and social security. They represent an enlargement of the usual 
catalogue of basic human rights49, which most often does not include 
rights to a healthy environment and habitat. All other rights, 
including rights of groups, women, disabled people, and nature’s 
rights, are listed in the following chapters. 
After stating that nature is a subject of rights in article 10, the 
Constitution lists the rights of nature in Title II, Chapter VII, and 
stipulates that they are, alike all other Constitutional rights, fully 
actionable even in the absence of a legal regulatory framework (art. 
11). Nature is recognized the right to existence and conservation and 
to the regeneration of its life cycles, structure, function, and 
evolutionary processes (art. 71) and the state is called to promote 
the protection and respect of natural assets. If such rights are failed 
and nature is damaged, nature itself is recognized a right to 
restoration. Usually such right is recognized only to those 
individuals or groups negatively affected by a natural damage, while 
in this article the restoration of the environment is explicitly 
independent from the restoration of people’s assets (art. 72) 50 . 
Environment’s rights can be claimed by any person, community or 
people (art. 71), and the state has the duty to implement the 
instruments necessary to limit the activities that may negatively 
effect the environment, including the introduction of exotic species 
(art. 73). Most importantly, as article 74 indicates, the recognition 
of such rights to nature does not entail the prohibition of any use, 
extraction and exploitation of natural resources. The pursuit of buen 
 
48 P. Benalcàzar Alarcòn, Il buen vivir  -  sumak kawsay - La construzione di un 
paradigma per una diversa umanità (Ecuador)’,  in «Futuro Indigeno. Il  
Futuro Delle Americhe», R. Martufi and L. Vasapollo, edited by, Milano, Jaca 
Book, 2009, p. 325 f.  
49 Houtart,  El concepto de sumak kawsay (buen vivir) y su correspondencia 
con el bien común de la humanidad ,  p. 71, cit .  
50 M. Melo, De Montecristi  a Cochabamba ,  in Los derechos de la naturaleza y 
el derecho a la existencia ,  C.E. Gallegos-Anda and C. Pérez Fernandez, 
edited by, Quito, Ministero de Justitia, Derechos Humanon y Cultos, 2011, p. 
97 f.  
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vivir, and of the rights of buen vivir (human rights to water and 
food, a science and culture, etc), are said to prevail over the intact 
conservation of nature, though they are limited by the duty to use 
natural resources in rational and sustainable ways (art. 83). Buen 
vivir is also used as the guiding principle and final goal of the 
regime of development of the state (Title VI, Development 
Structure). Development is defined precisely as the dynamic and 
sustainable union of economic, political, social, cultural, and 
environmental processes leading to buen vivir (art. 275). Hence, 
development is called upon as not only sustainable but also 
inclusive of cultural and environmental features.  
In order to live up to the concept of buen vivir, the Constitution 
calls for the protection of human individual and collective rights, as 
well as nature’s rights (art. 277). Title VII (articles 340-415) is 
entirely dedicated to the realization of buen vivir  with 
comprehensive articles which address the following rights: 
education, health, social security, habitat, nutrition, culture, leisure 
and media, science, traditional knowledge, risk management, 
population, and transport. In chapter II, dedicated to Biodiversity 
and Natural Resources, Ecuador commits to the pursuit of 
sustainable development goals for the sake of present and future 
generations while respecting the environment (art. 395), applying 
the precautionary principle51, and committing to act for the complete 
restoration of environmental damages (art. 396 and 397). Most 
importantly, art. 397 recognizes the duty of the state to accept all 
appeals of natural and juridical subjects, groups and communities 
addressed at the halt of environmental damages, even if such 
subjects are not directly affected by the damage. Moreover, it 
reverses the burden of proof to the accused, which now has the duty 
to show that its activity is not actually damaging the environment. 
Finally, in art. 400, echoing the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity, Ecuador asserts its sovereign rights over natural and 
genetic resources present in its territory and commits to manage 
them according to the interests of present and future generations. 
 
51  According to the precautionary principle, «where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation», United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio Declaration ,  Principle 15. 
 15 
3.2. Buen Vivir 
The adoption of the 2008 Constitution was praised by many 
scholars, indigenous leaders, and environmental activists as a 
victory over inefficacious anthropocentric approaches based on the 
recognition of human interests as the sole worth of legal 
protection52. The recognition of a set of rights to nature implicitly 
recognizes it as an entity having moral standing and being worthy of 
legal protection 53 , regardless of its utility for human beings. The 
victory was described as the overtaking of indigenous traditional 
ethics over Western ethics, as the transformation of indigenous 
teachings into legal words, as the perfect convergence between 
indigenous worldviews, the law and the decolonization of the 
country54, and as the cast away of the unsustainable American way of 
life 55. The inclusion of a concept derived from their tradition into 
the Constitution was cherished as the result of political and social 
changes finally retrieving their collective memory56. 
Buen vivir is called by many to be the foundation of such a shift 
in the role of indigenous peoples traditions and in the relationship 
between nature and human beings. It is a shift from an 
anthropocentric to a cosmocentric model which is associated with, 
according to Arturo Escobar, a «“conceptual breakthrough” in the 
development models of the last decade» 57 . Catherine Walsh 
considers buen vivir as the holistic vision of the world of Andinean 
indigenous peoples based on the idea of harmonic wellbeing in 
 
52  V. Bretón, D. Cortez, and F. García, En busca del sumak kawsay ,  in 
«Íconos, Revista de  Ciencias  Sociales», 48, 2014, p. 9 f. 
53  Melo, De Montecristi  a Cochabamba ,  p. 137, cit;  Baldin, I diritti  della 
natura nelle Costituzioni di Ecuador e Bolivia ,  p. 27, cit .  
54 E. Fitz-Henry, The Natural Contract: From Lévi-Strauss to the Ecuadorian 
Constitutional Court ,  in «Oceania», 82-3, 2012, p. 269; Melo, De Montecristi 
a Cochabamba ,  p. 123 f. ,  cit;  Bretón, Cortez, and García, En busca del Sumak 
Kawsay ,  p. 9 f,  cit .  
55 J.M. Tortosa, El Futuro Del Maldesarrollo ,  in «Revista Obets», 4, 2009, p. 
67–83; Acuna Rozo, Il constituzionalismo in vigore nei paesi dell’america 
latina,  cit .  
56 Houtart,  El concepto de Sumak Kawsay (buen vivir) y su correspondencia 
con el bien común de la humanidad ,  p. 57, cit .  
57  A. Escobar, Una minga para el postdesarrollo: lugar, medio ambiente y 
movimientos sociales en las transformaciones globales,  Lima, Universidad 
Nacional Mayor de San Marcos. Programa Democracia y Transformación 
Global, 2010, p. 25 (my translation). 
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communion with nature58. Nature is not only one of the elements of 
life, it is the mother who cares for her sons and daughters, providing 
them with «space, food and elements»59. Buen vivir  is described as a 
practical and spiritual vision that guides humans, and all 
interconnected aspects of their life (social, cultural, spiritual, 
economic), towards a balanced and fair relationship with nature 60. 
Walsh adds that buen vivir is also embraced by Afro-American 
communities of former slaves 61. According to her, the underlying 
principles of buen vivir are not a speciality of Ecuadorian or Latin 
American indigenous peoples, but are instead the world-wide 
alternative to Western capitalistic worldviews. For Ecuador, Walsh 
writes, the principles of buen vivir  are the alternative to the 
colonially imposed philosophy of economic development, of 
consumerist versions of the good life. They are the needed 
alternative to find the right balance between humans and the 
environment, following the teachings common to all indigenous 
peoples in the world 62 . Accordingly, also the Confederación de 
Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador describes the concept of buen 
vivir as the new model of life, alternative to Western ones and 
suitable for the whole world to reach happiness and harmony with 
mother nature63. 
3.2.1. A Fuzzy Concept 
Notwithstanding its success, the path traced by buen vivir is 
paved with shadows and pitfalls. In fact, the concept of buen vivir 
appears to be very fuzzy 64, not as clear and specific as needed to 
guide the development of a country towards a one-direction non-
anthropocentric and harmonic relationship with the environment. 
For Sánchez Parga, the Constitution is doomed to remain at a 
constituent state of lex ferandi, too nebulous to be transformed into 
 
58  C. Walsh, Interculturalidad, estado, sociedad. Luchas (de)coloniales de 
nuestra época ,  Quito, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Ediciones Abya-
Yala, 2009, p. 216. 
59 Ibidem .  
60 Ibidem ,  p. 220. 
61 Ibidem ,  p. 213. 
62 Ibidem ,  p. 215 ff.  
63 Houtart,  El concepto de Sumak Kawsay (Buen Vivir) y su correspondencia 
con el bien común de la humanidad ,  p. 59, cit .  
64 For the use of fuzzwords  and buzzwords  in the development discourse, see 
A. Cornwall and D. Eade, edited by, Deconstructing Development Discourse. 
Buzzwords and Fuzzwords ,  Warwickshire, Practical Action Publishing in 
association with Oxfam GB, 2010. 
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a coherent and comprehensive system of laws and institutions65. The 
fuzziness of buen vivir makes it too vulnerable to uses that are not 
in line with the indigenous traditions and with the overall call of the 
Constitution for a different relationship with the environment. 
Hidalgo-Capitán and Cubillo-Guevara argue that consensus on 
its meaning does not go beyond the very basic idea of way of life in 
harmony with nature 66 , and, as such, it is not suitable to be the 
«vertebral axis» of the Constitution 67 . Acosta looks at buen vivir  
from the grounds of indigenous traditional knowledge and 
worldviews, in search of a new relationship with nature, but warns 
against the inappropriate transformation of such concept in an 
advertising motif to brand all state projects, even the most 
anthropocentric ones 68 . Accordingly, Bretón et al. and Viola 
Recasens claim that the concept is ambiguous and equivocal, a sort 
of a catchall used to fit very different perceptions and approaches, 
from the natural resources extractive programs of the government to 
the pro-indigenous rights projects of non-governmental 
organizations 69. Houtart follows suite, maintaining that buen vivir  
has also been used to label unsustainable extractive projects under 
human rights promises with the excuse of planned redistribution of 
profits to the poorest layers of the population70. For Hidalgo-Capitán 
and Cubillo-Guevara, buen vivir changes features every time a 
different author or politician approaches it 71 . Depending on their 
political, ideological or philosophical point of view, they fill buen 
vivir with different meanings and picture it as having different 
origins. Different meanings that range from those more concentrated 
on the protection and revitalization of indigenous peoples rights and 
 
65 J.  Sánchez Parga, Discursos retrovolucionarios: sumak kausay, derechos de 
la naturaleza y otros pachamamismos ,  in «Ecuador Debate», 84, 2011, p. 36. 
66  A.L. Hidalgo-Capitán and A.P. Cubillo-Guevara, Seis debates abiertos 
sobre el sumak kawsay ,  in «Iconos. Revista de Ciencias Sociales», 48, 2014, 
p. 26. 
67 Senplades, Plan nacional de desarrollo/ Plan nacional para el buen vivir 
2013-2017 ,  p. 23, cit .  
68 A. Acosta, Riesgos y amenazas para el buen vivir ,  «Ecuador Debate», 84, 
2011, p. 44–51. 
69  Bretón, Cortez, and García, En busca del sumak kawsay ,  p. 11 ff.;  A.V. 
Recasens, Discursos  “pachamamistas” versus políticas desarrollistas: el 
debate sobre el sumak kawsay en los andes,  «Iconos .  Revista de Ciencias 
Sociales», 48, 2014, p. 60. 
70 Houtart,  El concepto de sumak kawsay (buen vivir) y su correspondencia 
con el bien común de la humanidad ,  p. 72 f. ,  cit .  
71  Hidalgo-Capitán and Cubillo-Guevara, Seis Debates Abiertos Sobre El 
Sumak Kawsay ,  cit .  
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culture, to those actually interested in socialist development 
agendas that use buen vivir  as a label both for projects aimed at the 
increase of economic activities (including unsustainable ones), and 
for those with post-development schemas concerned with the 
protection of the environment and the democratization of economic 
and political activities. All these different positions enrich the 
concept but also foster its lack of clarity and ability to stand for 
conflicting aims, potentially conflicting among each other, 
conflicting with indigenous worldviews and aspirations, and 
conflicting with the protection of the environment. 
Buen vivir  is, in fact, at danger of being used to argue in favour 
of a classical anthropocentric development paradigm: as long as 
development is promoted as a way to improve poor peoples’ lives, to 
increase inclusion and promote the protection of basic human rights 
(listed in the Constitution as Derechos del buen vivir), it could be 
argued that it promotes buen vivir , regardless of its environmental 
impact. Buen vivir  also stands for inclusion, multi-ethnicity, rights 
to education and work, which are all aims that can be achieved with 
an increased income for the government through the (unsustainable) 
exploitation of natural resources. 
Buen vivir  entrusts the state with a set of duties concerning the 
environment precisely as a means to achieve the protection of a set 
of human rights, the rights of buen vivir . Hence, it could be 
maintained that it promotes an anthropocentric approach rather than 
a non-anthropocentric one. In fact, the use of environmental 
resources to achieve buen vivir  is not prohibited – it is explicitly 
allowed (art. 74). Moreover, article 14 declares that the protection 
of the environment and the conservation of a healthy and 
ecologically balanced environment are public interests and rights of 
the Ecuadorian people. Therefore, the Constitution is treating 
nature, also, as an element which has instrumental value, as an 
element to be used to achieve the wellbeing of people. 
The fuzziness of buen vivir  leaves it exposed to interpretations 
that alienate it from its indigenous roots. The next paragraph faces 
this problem questioning the very labelling of buen vivir as an 
indigenous concept. Then, a broader view on the Constitution will 
propose a way out towards a more concrete and environmentally-
concerned buen vivir. 
3.2.2. An Indigenous Concept? 
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The lack of clarity on the meaning and content of buen vivir and 
its shifting grounds from anthropocentric to non-anthropocentric 
positions is connected to the question to what degree it really 
belongs to indigenous peoples worldviews of the Andes. Bretón et 
al. argue that it is not as firmly rooted in Andean indigenous 
traditions as it is often suggested 72. According to Viola Recasens, 
there is no evidence in anthropological literature of the use of the 
concept in indigenous societies before the advent of the 2008 
Constitution 73 . He argues that buen vivir was created ad hoc to 
revive the culture of the subordinated groups of the society – 
indigenous peoples – but not through a real understanding of their 
worldviews and practices. It is rather an act of political 
ventriloquisms74, of «invented traditions» based on an idealized and 
stereotypical vision of indigenous peoples deeply rooted in ecology 
and anti-capitalistic ideologies 75 . Viola Recanses calls it «a 
postmodern version of Rousseau’s “noble savage”»76. Other authors 
are softer in their critique and call it a case of «re-creation» by 
indigenous scholars, which have transformed a concept existing in 
some indigenous peoples by filling its gaps and determining its 
blurred borders using modern ideologies and rhetoric77. 
According to Viola Recasens, the lack of clarity and the 
ambiguous indigenous/non-indigenous features of buen vivir make it 
not completely appropriate to guide a consistent political and 
economic change of a country 78. On the contrary: it even fuelled 
 
72 Bretón, Cortez, and García, En busca del sumak kawsay ,  cit .  
73  Viola Recasens, Discursos “pachamamistas” versus políticas 
desarrollistas: el debate sobre el sumak kawsay en los Andes ,  p. 63, cit;  see 
also Hidalgo-Capitán and Cubillo-Guevara, Seis debates abiertos sobre el 
sumak kawsay ,  p. 32, cit .  
74 Bretón, Cortez, and García, En busca del sumak kawsay ,  p. 12, cit .  
75  Viola Recasens, Discursos “pachamamistas” versus políticas 
desarrollistas: el debate sobre el sumak kawsay en los andes’,  p. 64 ff. ,  cit .  
76  Viola Recasens 2014, p.69 cited in C.E. Gallegos-Anda, Development in 
Ecuador “the bifurcation of modernity and good living” ,  Greenconference 
Procedings ,  2015 (my translation). Even though it  is usually attributed to 
Rousseau’s Discours sur l 'origine de l ' inégalité parmi les hommes ,  1745, he 
does actually use the term noble savage anywhere in the text.  It  was instead 
coined, in 1609, by Marc Lescarbot in his book Histoire de la Nouvelle-
France ,  see T. Ellingson, The Myth of the Noble Savage ,  London, University 
of California Press, 2001, p. XV. 
77 Hidalgo-Capitán and Cubillo-Guevara, Seis debates abiertos sobre el sumak 
kawsay ,  p. 33, cit .  
78  Viola Recasens, Discursos “pachamamistas” versus políticas 
desarrollistas: el debate sobre el sumak kawsay en los Andes ,  p. 64, cit .  
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problems concerning its practical implementation, worsened by the 
lack of means – economic, institutional, social, and cultural – and of 
political will. 
No matter how well founded these critiques might be, it is very 
hard to delineate the actual content of indigenous traditions. 
Indigenous culture and worldviews have not remained still and 
unchanged through the last five hundred years, contrary to what the 
noble savage myth would suggest. They have transformed as all 
cultures transform and they have incorporated and reacted to 
newcomers’ concepts and principles. To expect that indigenous 
peoples’ worldviews and traditions remain pristine and untouched 
by Western ideas, concepts, and vocabulary is the first step to doom 
them to succumb to external pressures or vanish into history. 
Consequently, even though buen vivir  may not appear as the perfect 
translation of an ancient tradition into a Spanish juridical wording, 
it may be considered as a positive product of the interaction between 
indigenous traditions and left and green movements, accompanied 
by the adoption of the human rights vocabulary and rhetoric by 
indigenous peoples79. 
The problems linked to the difficult and heterogeneous 
interpretation of the fuzzy concept of buen vivir do remain 
nevertheless. However, they could be overcome thanks to the other 
innovative feature of the Ecuadorian Constitution: the inclusion of 
rights of the environment within its provisions. As we will see 
below, the fuzziness of buen vivir can be put aside by such a strong 
clue for a non-anthropocentric interpretation of the Constitution. 
3.3. Rights of the Environment 
Recognizing nature as a right holder means to treat it as a 
subject, as a person. This presupposition – made explicit in art. 10 – 
elevates nature to the level of humans and groups. Other fictitious 
persons, such as corporations and organizations, which are not 
human, nor centrally hinged in human beings as groups and 
minorities, are already recognized as subjects of law. Corporations 
can enter contracts, and through them they can become holders of 
rights – most typically rights of property –, but they are not 
recognized as holders of interests so important to be granted special 
 
79 For a critique over indigenous peoples and the use of human rights rhetoric, 
see R. Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism. Human Rights and the Politics of 
Identity ,  Berkeley, University of California Press, 2003, p. 118.  
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protection in constitutions, the same protection attributed to human 
and group rights 80 . The allocation of rights to nature in the 
Ecuadorian Constitution, therefore, is ground-breaking: it follows a 
non-anthropocentric cosmocentric conception of the environment. 
Holistic, cosmocentric perceptions of nature – such as indigenous 
peoples’ and Leopold’s ones – present the environment as a source 
of duties and responsibilities in its integrity, and such duties are 
concentrated on the actions that humans have to follow. Ecuador’s 
Constitution proposes a right-based approach to a cosmocentric 
vision, extending legal rights to elements of the environment – 
living and non-living – on the lines of what Christopher Stone 
suggests in Should Trees have Standing?. 
Stone gives an example of a right-based approach which is 
neither animal-rights based nor biocentric – he does not regard only 
individual animals as rights-holders, but all living beings, including 
plants, rivers and species. Stone does not focus on the environment 
in its entirety, but rather on aggregated assets of nature, such as 
entire ecosystems and species, as well as single elements, such as 
streams and mountains. He argues that as the evolution of law has 
entailed the enlargement of the holders of rights to satisfy 
differentiated needs and interests, hence their evolution should now 
lead to the recognition of rights to the environment. The Ecuadorian 
Constitution does not only entitle nature with rights (art. 10) but 
also meets the requirements that Stone regards necessary for the 
recognition of rights to nature (articles 71 and 72): some public 
authoritative body is willing take action if the rights are violated; 
the natural asset concerned can start a legal action by asking for it 
through their representatives; courts must take injury to the natural 
asset as relevant and the relief granted must aim at 
benefiting/restoring the natural asset81. 
Importantly, the approach chosen by the Constitution seems to 
suggest that the conservation of the environment as a whole is more 
essential than the protection of a single animal or plant, as animal 
rights ethics would require. There is, in fact, no reference to animal 
 
80 The attribution of such rights to nature is not unproblematic. A number of 
questions emerge: who is entitled to claim them and to determine what stands 
in nature’s interest? Which rights prevail over others and is there a hierarchy 
between human rights and nature’s rights? However, those questions will not 
be treated in the present article. 
81 C. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Law, Morality and the Environment, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 4. 
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rights and nature is always addressed in its entirety or as composed 
of macro-elements, including species and populations. This 
distinction is relevant from the point of view of conservation 
actions. In fact, as seen above, individualistic approaches based on 
rights of certain animals or of all living beings (the fist two streams 
of non-anthropocentric ethics: animal rights and biocentric views) 
are not always suitable to promote the conservation of the 
environment because they do not allow certain conservation 
practices such as the eradication of invasive species. 
Vis à vis  the fuzziness of the central concept of buen vivir, 
nature’s rights can have an essential role in the Ecuadorian 
Constitution. They set the limit beyond which the quest for buen 
vivir may not go: in the attempt to improve human lives – from 
cultural, economic, spiritual points of view – private and state 
actions may be conducted in accordance with the respect for 
nature’s rights. The idea of a possible coexistence between human 
use of the environment and its protection is not problematic: it 
endorses the indigenous understanding of human-environment 
relationship – as opposed to the idea of wilderness and pristine 
environment82. As long as development fuelled by the idea of buen 
vivir is pursued with respect for the rights of the environment, the 
non-anthropocentric approach of the Constitution could be saved. 
Just as human rights recognized in constitutions act as the limit to 
the power of the state, nature’s rights could act as the limit to the 
state’s and human beings’ power in the Ecuadorian Constitution. 
The recognition of rights to the environment could be a clear sign of 
the direction that the Constitution could take towards a non-
anthropocentric cosmocentric approach, innovative for a 
constitution, inspired by indigenous peoples worldviews, and highly 
promising for the conservation of the environment. 
Interestingly, Viola Recasens raises critiques against labelling 
the idea of the rights of nature as indigenous83. He recognizes that 
many indigenous peoples have maintained sustainable practices and 
lifestyles, but they differ, he claims, from the aims and means of 
 
82 The terms pristine environment  and wilderness  are often connected to an 
early conservation approach called fortress conservation ,  according to which 
the protection of the environment could only be guaranteed by shutting people 
out of protected areas altogether as they were always bound to use resources 
unsustainably, see Claus, Kai, and Satterfield, The Roles of People in 
Conservation ,  p. 266, cit .  
83  Viola Recasens, Discursos “pachamamistas” versus políticas 
desarrollistas: el debate sobre el sumak kawsay en los Andes’,  cit .  
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positions based on the rights of nature. When dealing with nature’s 
rights, nature turns into a definite being – separated from human 
beings – while, as noted above, indigenous worldviews tend to 
perceive humans as part of the environment84. 
Indigenous customary laws are centred on the purpose of 
protecting the wellbeing of the community through the control of 
individual actions and the imposition of practices that are respectful 
of the environment. The perception of a strong dependence of the 
community on the surrounding environment is, in fact, deeply 
entrenched in their customary laws and it is acknowledged that 
environmental degradation is threatening the community. Thus, 
customary laws create systems of entrenched duties and limits to 
guide community members towards a non-detrimental use of the 
environment, and to entail them with the responsibility to protect it. 
In such a traditionally intimate human-environmental relationship – 
a structure at the centre of which there is a sense of responsibility – 
the recognition of a set of rights to nature might appear different 
from the recognition of stewardships duties. Nevertheless, these 
responsibilities could be seen «as the flip side of the human duties 
within a legal system that recognises rights» to the environment85. 
The Constitution has chosen a rights-based language, which is not 
completely alien to the idea of duties and responsibilities towards 
nature. It is its counterpart. In fact, article 83 prescribes the duty of 
all Ecuadorians to respect the rights of the environment, and protect 
the territorial integrity of Ecuador and its natural resources. In 
addition, article 399 refers to «State guardianship over the 
environment and joint responsibility of the citizenry for its 
conservation»86. Precisely because indigenous relationship with the 
environment and their institutions diverge from those of states, the 
translation of indigenous worldviews into the legal system of a state 
may not be the most accurate literal translation. But it may still 
promote the conservation of the environment suggesting alterations 
to the classical anthropocentric approach of the law 87, such as the 
 
84  Iorns Magallanes, Maori Cultural Rights in Aotearoa New Zealand: 
Protecting the Cosmology That Protects the Enviroment,  p. 279, cit .  
85  C.J. Iorns Magallanes, Nature as an Ancestor: Two Examples of Legal 
Personality for Nature in New Zealand’,  «VertigO - La revue électronique en 
sciences de l’environnement», 2015, p. 10. 
86  Kotzè and Calzadilla Villavicencio, Somewhere Between Rhetoric and 
Reality: Environmental Constitutionalism and the Rights of Nature in 
Ecuador’,  p. 23, cit .  
87 Ibidem ,  p. 6. 
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inclusion of nature’s rights, while at the same time furthering the 
protection of indigenous recognition and rights88. 
4. Conclusion 
In 2000, the Nobel prize winner Paul Crutzen suggested that the 
Earth had entered a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene 89 , 
characterized by a radical change in the relationship between 
humans and the environment 90 . As a geological epoch, the 
Anthropocene has not yet been validated but it is widely used «to 
designate the period of Earth’s history during which humans have a 
decisive influence on the state, dynamics and future of the Earth 
system» 91 . Regardless of whether or not it can be considered a 
geological epoch, the Anthropocene can be used as a metaphor to 
draw attention to the current environmental crisis. The 
Anthropocene and the very creation of such a term raises our 
awareness towards the threat that humankind is for the Earth. 
Whether we take a weak anthropocentric position or whether we 
stand on the side of non-anthropocentric ethics, we need to reduce 
our impact on the planet. We may do it to save present and future 
generations from suffering or to protect their fundamental rights; or 
we may foster the protection of the environment because we believe 
it has an intrinsic value independent from our needs and interests, or 
because we perceive animals and plants as living beings deserving 
to pursue their ends in healthy and diverse ecosystems. Each of 
these ethical approaches has its pros and cons in terms of 
effectiveness and is of different political and economic appeal; each 
has high costs for what is our standard of living, especially in rich 
Western societies. Each requires us, and most importantly our 
 
88  Iorns Magallanes, Maori Cultural Rights in Aotearoa New Zealand: 
Protecting the Cosmology That Protects the Enviroment ,  p. 275, cit .  Iorns 
refers to the recent Whanganui river example, on the topic see also A. Kothari 
and S. Bajpai,  Can the Ganga Have Human Rights? ,  in «The Hindu», 2017. 
89 C. Hamilton, C. Bonneuil,  and F. Gemenne, Thinking the Anthropocene ,  in 
The Anthropocene and the Global Environmental Crisis.  Rethinking 
Modernity in a New Epoch ,  C. Hamilton, C. Bonneuil,  and F. Gemenne, edited 
by, London, New York, Earthscan Publication, Routledge, 2015, p. 1. 
90  Boyd, The Environmental Rigths Revolution. A Global Study of 
Constitutions, Human Rights and the Environment ,  p. 10, cit .  
91  Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy, Working Group on the 
Anthropocene ,  2016, at 
https://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/workinggroups/anthropocene/. See also J. 
Zalasiewicz, C. Waters, and M.J. Head, Anthropocene: Its Stratigraphic 
Basis ,  in «Nature», 541, 2017, p. 289. 
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governments, to change the current ways of exploitation of natural 
resources. 
This article has analysed an attempt to change a state’s 
relationship with the environment through the inclusion of the 
notion of buen vivir and the recognition of rights to the 
environment. The 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution was the first to ever 
recognize a set of rights to the environment: rights to existence, 
conservation, regeneration of life cycles, structure and function and 
evolutionary processes. The Constitution, however, was not the first 
to recognize rights to natural assets as Germany, India, and 
Switzerland have already recognized rights to animals. Hence, 
Ecuador was not the first to move from anthropocentric to non-
anthropocentric ethics (even though certain animal rights positions 
rather seem to imply an enlargement of the concept of anthropos –  
particularly including human-like animals – than a real shift to non-
anthropocentric approaches), but the first to embrace, more 
specifically, a rights-based cosmocentric approach, following 
Stone’s Should Trees Have Standing?. 
The Constitution recognizes rights to the environment and 
underlines that the state is responsible for conservation and 
restoration of natural assets, but it also recognizes that such rights 
do not entail the prohibition of use, extraction, and exploitation of 
natural resources. This should, however, not come as a surprise. It 
would be irrational for a state to sustain the complete prevalence of 
the environment over its citizens’ needs and to recognize complete 
prevalence to the right to existence of nature over its use. Moreover, 
a lot depends on the interpretation of the idea of nature. If it is 
interpreted along cosmocentric approaches, according to non-
individualistic stances, the use, extraction, and exploitation of 
natural assets is not, in itself, wrong if practiced in sustainable 
ways. In the Ecuadorian Constitution the purpose of natural 
resources use, extraction, and exploitation is the pursuit of the buen 
vivir, while the limit is the respect of the rights of the environment. 
However, the concept of buen vivir , or sumak kawsay, is a fuzzy 
and scarcely defined term: it seems to act as a catchall term lumping 
together potentially contradictory post-development, 
anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric positions. It is, in fact, 
being used by Ecuadorian political and economic actors to label 
very different kinds of activities – from the most environmentally 
sound to the most detrimental – by presenting them as aimed at 
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increasing the economic, cultural, and/or social aspects of the lives 
of Ecuadorian citizens. 
Buen vivir  also does not seem to have been rooted in indigenous 
anthropological literature before the writing of the Constitution. 
However, it would not be appropriate to deny any influence of 
indigenous peoples and their cultures and claims on the 
Constitutional development of the country – underlined by the 
presence of indigenous representatives at the Constitutional 
Assembly. Indigenous culture and worldviews are not static entities 
conserved indistinctly since the arrival of the colonizers. They have 
changed and they have incorporated elements of Western traditions, 
in particular human rights traditions and rhetoric, and are now 
embracing ideas which may promote their cosmologic approaches in 
the relationship with the environment, including the recognition of 
rights, and legal personhood, to environmental elements. 
If accompanied by a coherently environmentally concerned 
government, the inclusion of buen vivir in the Constitution could 
provide the basis for a real environmental revolution in Ecuador. 
This is to say if it is, in fact, interpreted together with the insertion 
of rights of nature, and if the new Constitution re-acquires a non-
anthropocentric approach, based on the recognition of moral 
standing to nature and its constituting elements. Nature’s rights to 
existence, conservation, regeneration, structure, and evolutionary 
processes cannot go unnoticed simply because buen vivir has 
undefined borders and contains elements of anthropocentric 
positions. 
It may be that the Ecuadorian example, which suggests the 
incorporation of indigenous worldviews in national and international 
law, is the right way forward. 
The revival and deliberate construction of environmental ethics from 
the raw materials of indigenous, traditional, and contemporary 
cognitive cultures represents an important and essential first step in the 
future movement of human material cultures toward a more symbiotic 
relationship, however incomplete and imperfect,  with the natural 
environment.92 
Nevertheless, as Callicot reminds us: «compliance with an 
ethic, even one hardened into law, is voluntary». The incorporation 
of new environmental ethics in constitutions may be the first step, 
but the next needs to be the creation of a common aspiration for 
 
92 Callicott,  The Challenge of a World Environmental Ethic ,  p. 69, cit .  
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human behaviour towards the conservation of the environment 93. I 
believe there is a lot to learn from indigenous peoples, but a deeper 
understanding and a more profound psychological change is needed 
to become accustomed and assimilated to a new environmental ethic.  
 
93 Ibidem ,  p. 66. 
